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Experimental philosophy’s ‘sources project’ seeks to develop 
psychological explanations of philosophically relevant 
intuitions which help us assess their evidentiary value. This 
paper develops a psycholinguistic explanation of intuitions 
prompted by brief philosophical case-descriptions. For proof 
of concept, we target intuitions underlying a classic paradox 
about perception (‘argument from hallucination’). We trace 
them to stereotype-driven inferences automatically executed 
in verb comprehension. We employ a forced-choice 
plausibility-ranking task to show that contextually 
inappropriate stereotypical inferences are made from less 
salient uses of the verb “to see”. This yields a debunking 
explanation which resolves the philosophical paradox.  
Keywords: Experimental philosophy; Sources Project; 
stereotype-driven inference; graded salience.  
Introduction 
Philosophical Research Context: This paper presents work 
that pioneers the use of psycholinguistic methods in 
experimental philosophy’s ‘Sources Project’. Experimental 
philosophy is a currently much-discussed and potentially 
transformative movement that imports methods from 
psychology into philosophy (for reviews see, Alexander, 
2012; Knobe & Nichols, 2014). Philosophers frequently 
conduct thought experiments which revolve around the 
consideration of hypothetical cases. Intuitive judgments 
about such cases are elicited by verbal case-descriptions and 
play key roles in philosophy: A ‘standard justificatory 
procedure’ uses such intuitions as evidence for/against 
philosophical theories (Bealer, 1996; Cath, in press); clashes 
of intuitions with each other or background beliefs generate 
influential philosophical paradoxes and problems (Fischer, 
2011; Papineau, 2009). Experimental philosophers employ 
surveys and experimental methods from psychology to 
elicit, explain, or assess such intuitions. 
The strand of the movement that currently attracts most 
philosophical attention is the ‘Warrant Project’ (for a review 
see, Stich & Tobia, 2015). This project seeks to assess the 
evidentiary value of philosophically relevant intuitions and 
philosophers’ warrant for accepting them. Up to now, the 
project mainly employs questionnaire-based surveys to 
study the sensitivity of intuitions to demographic parameters 
like gender, age, personality type, or cultural or socio-
economic background (Weinberg et al., 2001), as well as 
questionnaire-based experiments to investigate order and 
framing effects (e.g., Petrinovich & O’Neill, 1996, 
Weinberg et al., 2012). The standard approach has 
experimental philosophers make inferences from such 
sensitivity or effects to lack of evidentiary value. Many of 
these inferences are philosophically problematic (for a 
review see, Fischer & Collins, 2015), and various studies 
have failed to replicate previous results about sensitivity to 
demographic factors (e.g., Nagel et al., 2013; 
Seyedsayamdost, 2015a,b). It is therefore timely to pursue 
the philosophically crucial aims of the Warrant Project with 
fresh approaches. 
The most ambitious strand of the Warrant Project, 
known as ‘Sources Project’ (Pust, 2012) or ‘cognitive 
epistemology’ (Fischer et al., 2015), explores such 
approaches: It seeks to develop and experimentally test 
psychological explanations of intuitions that help us assess 
their evidentiary value. One promising approach is to look 
for explanations that trace intuitions back to largely 
automatic cognitive processes that are generally reliable but 
predictably engender cognitive illusions, under specific 
circumstances. The most prominent line of such research 
traces intuitive knowledge attributions back to a ‘mind-
reading’ capacity subject to specific biases (Alexander et al., 
2015; Gerken & Beebee, 2016; Turri, 2015). 
Our research breaks new ground by examining whether 
philosophically relevant intuitions are generated or 
influenced by routine language processes, viz., by automatic 
inference processes that routinely occur in text 
comprehension and production. This approach seems 
worthwhile for the many philosophical relevant intuitions 
that are elicited by verbal descriptions of hypothetical cases. 
Elsewhere (Fischer et al., 2015; Fischer & Engelhardt 
2016), we have argued that the routine process of 
stereotype-driven amplification (Levinson, 2000; cf. Garrett 
& Harnish, 2007) is generally reliable but engenders 
cognitive illusions, under specific vitiating circumstances. 
This paper explores the role of this process in generating 
intuitions at the root of influential philosophical paradoxes 
about perception, known as ‘arguments from hallucination’. 
We show that vitiating circumstances obtain in their 
formulation. This finding debunks the intuitions and helps 
resolve the paradoxes.  
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Philosophical Application: Together with ‘arguments 
from illusion’, arguments from hallucination engender the 
classic ‘problem of perception’ (Smith, 2002), which has 
again become a focus of debate (Brewer, 2011; Crane, 2015; 
Fish, 2009; Robinson, 2001). Both arguments lead to the 
conclusion that when people use their five senses, they are 
(directly) aware only of subjective perceptions or sense-
data. The philosophical problem is that of reconciling this 
conclusion with the common-sense conviction that we see 
and otherwise perceive physical objects and public events. 
Philosophers typically formulate arguments from 
hallucination without world-knowledge about the 
phenomenon, assume merely that it is possible that ‘one 
‘perceives’ a physical object which is not there at all’ (Ayer, 
1956/1990, pg. 90), and proceed from brief descriptions of 
hypothetical cases. Analytic philosophers formulating the 
argument typically distinguish between different senses of 
perception-verbs like see: The relevant case-descriptions, 
they explain, use these verbs in a purely ‘phenomenal’ sense 
which serves merely to describe people’s experiences and 
which lacks the existential and spatial implications see, etc. 
ordinarily have. Here is a classic statement: 
‘Let us take as an example Macbeth’s 
visionary dagger: since we are concerned only 
with what is possible, the fact that this episode 
may be fictitious does not matter. There is an 
obvious [ordinary] sense in which Macbeth 
did not see the dagger; he did not see the 
dagger for the sufficient reason that there was 
no dagger there for him to see. There is 
another [viz., phenomenal] sense, however, in 
which it may quite properly be said that he did 
see a dagger; to say that he saw a dagger is 
quite a natural way of describing his 
experience. But still not a real dagger; not a 
physical object; not even the look of a physical 
object, if looks are open to all to see. If we are 
to say that he saw anything, it must have been 
something that was accessible to him alone, 
something that existed only so long as this 
experience lasted; in short a sense-datum.’ 
(Ayer, 1956, pg. 90) 
The second half of the argument then postulates that in this 
possible scenario the subject’s experience is qualitatively 
indistinguishable from the experience of seeing a physical 
object; it assumes that qualitatively indistinguishable 
experiences involve awareness of the same kind of object; 
and it concludes that all cases of perception involve 
awareness of sense-data. This second half has been widely 
criticized (for a review see, Smith, 2002). 
Already the argument’s first half, however, involves a 
curious mistake: The verb see is explicitly used here in a 
phenomenal sense: He saw a dagger is to mean ‘He had an 
experience as of / like that of / seeing a dagger’. An 
experience is being described by comparing it to that of 
seeing a certain physical object. This does not require that 
the object ‘seen’ be around, when the subject has the 
experience thus described. So we can say that Macbeth saw 
a physical dagger if his experience ‘is like that of seeing a 
solid, physical dagger’ (rather than, say, like that of seeing a 
strangely translucent dagger-image). The case-description 
explicitly makes this postulate (Ayer 1956, pg. 90), and the 
second half of the argument crucially depends upon it 
(above). Of course, only Macbeth ‘sees’ the dagger at this 
point, and he ‘sees’ it only in the phenomenal sense. But 
what he ‘sees’ in this sense is still ‘a real dagger’ – e.g., the 
very dagger now sticking in the king’s corpse next door. 
What is ‘special’ is the sense in which the argument uses the 
verb see, but not the object ‘seen’. So why did generations 
of competent philosophers (e.g., Price 1932, pg. 28-9; Ayer 
1956, pg. 90; Smith 2002, pg. 194-5), including 
philosophers who stress that the use of see and its cognates 
is special (viz., phenomenal), conclude that the object seen 
is special (namely, non-physical)?  
One key factor, we submit, is a spontaneous inference 
from ‘Macbeth sees a dagger’ to ‘there is something for 
Macbeth to see in his vicinity, before his eyes’. This 
Intuition (I) has thinkers take for granted that the 
‘something’ must be around for Macbeth to see, disregard 
that Macbeth is (in the phenomenal sense) aware of a real 
dagger (which currently is not in his physical vicinity), and 
think that the only way of avoiding the ‘preposterous … 
claim that a hallucinating person is aware of nothing 
whatever’ (Smith, 2002, 195) is to ‘recognize a non-normal 
object of awareness’ (ibid.), which is in the subject’s range 
of vision, before his eyes: Thinking in terms of an intuitive 
dichotomy between external and internal perception 
(introspection), proponents of the argument immediately 
conclude that the thing seen must be before the subject’s 
inner eye, in his mind. I.e.: We submit the argument rests on 
intuition (I), and (I), in turn, on inappropriate spatial 
inferences from the phenomenal use of see. 
Psycholinguistic explanation: Both nouns (Hare et al., 
2009) and verbs (Ferretti et al., 2001; Harmon-Vukic et al., 
2009) are associated with stereotypes. Verbs can be 
associated with typical features of events, agents, and 
patients, which jointly form structured stereotypes (a.k.a. 
‘generalized situation schemas’). E.g., manipulators are 
typically cunning and shrewd, and their victims naïve and 
gullible, so the verb manipulate is associated with ‘cunning’ 
and ‘shrewdness’ as agent-properties, and ‘naiveté’ and 
‘gullibility’ as patient-properties. Such associations guide 
spontaneous inferences from those expressions. Within a 
neo-Gricean framework, their interplay with integration 
processes (see below) is captured by the I-heuristic 
(Levinson, 2000; cf. Garrett & Harnish, 2007): In the 
absence of explicit indications to the contrary, infer that 
situations talked about conform to stereotypes associated 
with the nouns and verbs used! 
Stereotypical inferences are supported by automatic 
activation processes in semantic memory (McRae & Jones, 
2013). According to the well-supported graded salience 
hypothesis (Fein et al., 2015; Giora, 2003), a linguistic 
stimulus activates all semantic and stereotypical features 
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associated with the expression, in any of its uses or senses. 
The speed and strength of initial activation depends upon 
the ‘salience’ of the sense or use. This is a function of 
familiarity, conventionality, frequency, and prototypicality. 
Features associated with the expression’s most salient use 
are activated regardless of context. E.g., the ambiguous 
stimulus mint activates the probe ‘candy’ rapidly and 
strongly, even where it is clearly used in a less frequent 
sense (prime: All buildings collapsed except the mint) 
(Simpson & Burgess, 1985; Till et al., 1988). This facilitates 
contextually inappropriate inferences from less salient uses 
of words. Such inferences need not go through, since 
processes including reinforcement and decay (Oden & 
Spira, 1983), and suppression (Faust & Gernsbacher 1996) 
mitigate initial preferential activation of contextually 
inappropriate stereotypical associates, namely, in the light 
of contextual cues, explicit indications of deviation from 
relevant stereotypes, and explicit marking of less salient 
uses (Givoni et al., 2013). Where one use is very much more 
salient than another, and the stereotypical association with 
certain features particularly strong, inappropriate 
stereotypical inferences may, however, go through, even in 
the face of explicit indications to the contrary (Giora 2003). 
We hypothesize that this happens in the argument from 
hallucination. The verb see is used in at least three senses: 
an ordinary, literal, visual sense (Bob saw the builders fixing 
the road), a metaphorical, epistemic sense (Jane saw Joe’s 
point), and an extended phenomenal sense (Hitting his head, 
Jack saw stars). According to our first hypothesis, 
H1 The literal, visual sense of see is much more 
salient than the metaphorical, epistemic sense; 
this, in turn, is much more salient than the 
phenomenal sense. 
This non-salient sense is employed in the case-
descriptions that serve as first premises of the argument 
from hallucination. We hypothesize further that proponents 
of the argument then make contextually inappropriate 
stereotype-driven inferences from those premises: We 
assume that the most salient visual sense of see has a strong 
stereotypical association with spatial patient-properties: S 
sees X is strongly associated with ‘X is in front of S’ and ‘X 
is before S’s eyes’ (directional implications) as well as with 
‘X is around (S) to be seen’ and ‘X is within S’s range of 
vision’ (proximity implications). On this basis we 
hypothesize that 
H2 Competent speakers infer spatial patient-
properties stereotypically associated with the 
visual sense of see also from less salient 
epistemic and phenomenal uses. 
Such a stereotypical inference, we submit, leads 
proponents of the argument from hallucination from such 
initial premises as ‘When hallucinating, Macbeth sees a 
dagger’ to the intuitive judgment (I) that there is a dagger 
around for Macbeth to see, before his eyes (see above). H1 
and H2 could jointly explain the intuition (I) we identified as 
the intuitive source of the argument from hallucination. 
In following up H1, we bear in mind that salience is a 
function of familiarity, conventionality, frequency, and 
prototypicality. We think it unlikely that the visual and 
epistemic uses of see will attract different familiarity- or 
conventionality-ratings, and suggest salience differences are 
due to differences in frequency and prototypicality. A 
corpus study to establish frequency is still ongoing. First 
evidence for prototypicality differences is provided by a 
production study. 13 participants were asked to provide up 
to 10 written completions of 4 sentence stems containing 
either see or aware (e.g. Jane sees____; Bob saw____). To 
discourage mono-topical response strategies, participants 
were instructed to ‘try to give varied responses’. We coded 
responses as either perceptual (e.g. the handsome American) 
or non-perceptual (e.g. fresh opportunities). Results showed 
that completions of see were 94% perceptual use (by 
contrast, 51% for aware). This suggests that visual cases of 
‘seeing’ are by far the most prototypical of this category, 
and that the literal, visual sense of see is by far the most 
salient. Non-perceptual completions involved mainly 
epistemic uses. Phenomenal uses were absent. This is 
consistent with H1. We then used a forced-choice 
plausibility-ranking task to examine H2 and, specifically, 
explore spatial (directional and proximal) inferences from 
metaphorical/epistemic uses of see. 
Methods 
Participants 
Fifty undergraduate psychology students from the 
University of East Anglia were recruited through the 
participant pool and received course credit for participating. 
Materials 
We administered a paper-and-pencil questionnaire that had 
120 minimal pairs. There were 48 critical items and 72 
fillers. Twenty-four critical items contrasted see and aware. 
(Aware can be used in both perceptual and non-perceptual 
contexts and lacks directional implications in either.) The 
other 24 critical items contrasted see and think of. (Think of 
lacks proximity implications in all uses). The see-aware 
items consisted of single sentences, the see-think of items 
consisted of pairs of sentences (see Tables 1 and 2). 
 
Table 1: Example items for testing spatial inferences and 




1a. Mona sees the drivers ahead of her in the queue. 
1b. Mona is aware of the drivers ahead of her in the queue. 
Visual, Stereotype-Inconsistent 
2a. Ben sees the friend walking right behind him. 
2b. Ben is aware of the friend walking right behind him. 
Epistemic, Stereotype-Consistent 
3a. Emma sees the challenges facing her. 
3b. Emma is aware of the challenges facing her.  
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Epistemic, Stereotype-Inconsistent 
4a. Jim sees the scheming going on behind his back. 
4b. Jim is aware of the scheming going on behind his back. 
 
Table 2: Example items for testing proximity inferences (i.e. 
around to be see, within the range of vision). 
  
Visual, Stereotype-Consistent 
1. Megan spent the week at home. She saw/thought of her 
parents a lot. 
Visual, Stereotype-Inconsistent 
2. Sitting in the office, John sees/thinks of Peter. Peter is on 
holiday in Turkey. 
Epistemic, Stereotype-Consistent 
3. Joan sees/thinks of fresh opportunities. Some 
opportunities are around. 
Epistemic, Stereotype-Inconsistent 
4. Joe sees/thinks of ways to solve the problem. There are 
no solutions around. 
 
There were two manipulations. The first concerns the use of 
the verb see (literal/visual vs. metaphorical/epistemic). 
More specifically, it turns on whether the direct object of the 
main verb is a visible physical object (e.g. drivers, friends, 
etc., in the literal/visual condition) or an abstract object (e.g. 
challenges, scheming, etc., in the metaphorical/epistemic 
condition). The second variable manipulated was whether 
the remainder of the sentence was either consistent or 
inconsistent with the hypothesized stereotypical inferences, 
viz. directional and proximity inferences: In the stereotype-
consistent condition, the patient of see and aware is said or 
clearly implied to be in front of the agent or before the 
agent’s eyes; in the stereotype-inconsistent condition, the 
patient is placed behind the agent. Similarly, the patient of 
see and think of was placed in the vicinity or visual field of 
the agent, in the stereotype-consistent condition, and outside 
this field, in the stereotype-inconsistent condition. The 
critical verb in the see/think of items could occur in either 
first or second sentence (see Table 2).  
Design and Procedure 
The design of the study was 2 × 2 (visual/epistemic × s-
consistent/s-inconsistent). The visual/epistemic variable 
refers to the direct object (visual vs. abstract) of the critical 
verb. S-consistent/s-inconsistent refers to the 
‘consistency/inconsistency with spatial (directional and 
proximity) implications from literal/visual use of see’ and 
was contained in further contextual information in the 
sentence. Separate repeated-measures ANOVAs (with 
follow-up t-tests) were run on see/aware and see/think of 
separately. In line with our hypothesis H2, we expected see 
to be preferred with visual direct objects in s-consistent 
contexts, and aware and think of to be preferred with both 
visual and abstract direct objects in s-inconsistent contexts. 
The critical condition occurred when the direct object was 
abstract and invoked epistemic sense and the context was s-
inconsistent with directional and proximity inferences. For 
graphical purposes, we coded see responses as 1 and aware 
and think of responses as 0. Thus, high bars indicate greater 
preference for see.  
Participants were presented with pairs of sentences or 
short two-sentence pairs, which differ only in one critical 
word (i.e. minimal pairs). Participants were asked to 
indicate which of the two versions they thought was more 
plausible, and to make a judgment even if they did not have 
a clear preference. By noting how often participants 
preferred one version over the other, we can measure the 
consistency of plausibility judgments, and which of the two 
verbs have stronger stereotypical associations with the 
targeted spatial properties 
Results 
See vs. Aware  
Results showed that both main effects were significant 
(visual/epistemic F(1,48) = 171.75, p < .001 and s-
consistent/s-inconsistent F(1,48) = 662.78, p < .001). The 
interaction was also significant F(1,48) = 226.76, p < .001 
(see Figure 1). With visual direct objects, see was preferred 
over aware 96% of the time, when contexts were s-
consistent, but only 5% of the time when contexts were s-
inconsistent. With epistemic direct objects, see was 
preferred 44% of the time when contexts were s-consistent 
but only 8% of the time when contexts were s-inconsistent. 
The comparison of s-consistent and s-inconsistent was 
significant for both visual (t(48) = 45.35, p < .001) and 
epistemic (t(48) = 9.26, p < .001) senses. The preference for 
aware in the epistemic/s-consistent condition was not 




Figure 1: Results showing proportion of “see” responses 
with visual and epistemic objects. 
 
See vs. Think of 
Results showed that both main effects were significant 
(visual/epistemic F(1,48) = 92.93, p < .001 and s-
consistent/s-inconsistent F(1,48) = 817.33, p < .001). The 
interaction was also significant F(1,48) = 93.53, p < .001 
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(see Figure 2). With visual objects, see was preferred over 
think of 95% of the time when contexts were s-consistent, 
but only 2% of the time when contexts were s-inconsistent. 
With epistemic objects, see was preferred 58% of the time 
when contexts were s-consistent, but only 5% of the time 
when contexts were s-inconsistent. The comparison of s-
consistent vs s-inconsistent was significant for both visual 
t(48) = 43.83, p < .001 and epistemic t(48) = 12.75, p < .001 
senses. The preference for see in the epistemic/s-
inconsistent condition was significantly above chance t(48) 




Figure 2: Results showing proportion of “see” responses 
with visual and epistemic objects. 
Discussion 
These results are consistent with our key hypothesis H2 that 
competent speakers infer spatial patient-properties 
stereotypically associated with the visual sense of see also 
from epistemic and phenomenal uses. H2 implies that in 
epistemic contexts which are s-inconsistent, competent 
speakers will reject see in favor of verbs that work equally 
well in epistemic contexts but lack spatial implications. This 
is precisely what we found: As long as items were s-
consistent, participants had no pronounced preference for 
aware or think of over the evidently metaphorical use of see 
– all three verbs were deemed to work roughly equally well 
in these contexts. By contrast, participants had a very 
pronounced preference for aware and think of in epistemic 
contexts which were inconsistent with the (evidently 
irrelevant) spatial implications of see. This suggests that 
participants made spatial inferences from the verb even in 
these inappropriate contexts, resulting in perceived 
inconsistencies with the context, which in turn lower 
subjective plausibility. 
In conjunction with previous evidence that (H1) visual 
uses of see have higher salience than epistemic and 
phenomenal senses, this is also consistent with the graded 
salience hypothesis. This hypothesis could explain our key 
finding (see Introduction) and let us extend it: Speakers/ 
hearers are the more likely to infer features stereotypically 
associated with the most salient use of a word also from its 
less salient uses, the greater the difference in salience is 
(Simpson & Burgess, 1985). Since the phenomenal use of 
see is even less salient than the epistemic use (see 
Introduction), it stands to reason that competent speakers 
will be even more prone to make inappropriate spatial 
inferences from phenomenal than from epistemic uses. 
This conclusion can help resolve the targeted 
philosophical paradox (argument from hallucination), by 
debunking the intuition at its root, viz., that when Macbeth 
sees the dagger, there is something around for him to see, 
before his eyes. Our conclusion suggests that stereotype-
driven inferences from the most salient visual use of see 
have philosophers leap to this intuitive judgment from prior 
case-descriptions which use see in a phenomenal sense. The 
intuition is thus due to a contextually inappropriate 
stereotypical inference. More generally, we have identified a 
vitiating circumstance: The generally reliable process of 
stereotype-driven amplification (Levinson, 2000) misfires 
where a word with strong stereotypical associates of a 
highly salient use is employed in a much less salient sense. 
Future directions: We intend to garner further evidence 
for H1 through a computer-based rating experiment asking 
participants to rate ‘how good examples of seeing are 
afforded by the following cases’, whose descriptions include 
the three uses distinguished. To collect further evidence for 
H2 we intend to replicate the current results with a less 
artificial task, using pupillometry (Engelhardt et al., 2010). 
A more comprehensive explanation of the targeted 
intuitions will take further linguistic theories into account, 
such as head-driven phrase structure grammar (Pollard & 
Sag, 1994): When accessing a verb, we retrieve all 
associated syntactic information, including the grammatical 
roles (e.g., see requires a patient-role) and selection-
restrictions on role-fillers (e.g., physical objects and public 
events). This may account for the intuition that Macbeth 
sees something. This paper explains how this ‘something’ 
gets endowed with spatial features – which exclude any 
absent physical objects as patients of see. The situation from 
which the present intuition arises is not rare in philosophy: 
Philosophers often give familiar words special uses which 
are less salient than those in ordinary language. It bears 
investigating to what extent these uses prompt contextually 
inappropriate inferences and unwarranted intuitions. 
Conclusion 
Psycholinguistic methods and findings can be profitably 
used to identify and explain automatic inferences that 
generate philosophically relevant intuitions. For proof of 
concept, this paper showed how psycholinguistic data can 
contribute to debunking explanations of intuitions that 
engender philosophical paradoxes. 
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